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Laurance J. Splitter
Questioning the “Citizenship Industry”1
I argue that citizenship and related concepts should be treated warily by educators and researchers. Citizen-
ship cannot define who I am, nor can it plausibly ground moral or values education. For both these tasks, the 
relational concept of being a person in the world does a better, and simpler, job. I suggest that classrooms which 
take the concept of personhood seriously should function as inquiring communities, in which such issues as the 
meaning and importance of our affiliations and associations may be critically examined. There may be good 
reasons for the recent expansion of what I term “the citizenship industry” in educational research, but they 
should not be taken for granted, particularly given that the concept of citizenship is often used by governments 
around the world to support strongly nationalistic policies which are inimical to genuine inquiry and autonomy. 
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At least one reliable source has reported that studies 
on Civics and/or Citizenship Education have tripled 
in number since 2001.2 However, I am not convinced 
that such increased attention is warranted. Indeed, in 
this paper, I want to call into question the viability 
of the concept of citizenship education, particularly in 
the context of two areas which are of considerable 
contemporary interest: identity formation – both in-
dividual and socio-political – and moral education. I 
suggest that issues of identity and morality are better 
understood within a framework of ordinary person-
hood and, moreover, that working within this frame-
work places the onus on those who would argue for 
citizenship (as with religious) education – whether of 
the nationalistic, tribal or global variety – to demon-
strate that their goals are both educationally worth-
while and consistent with the development of young 
people as persons in what I am calling the “ordinary” 
sense, to be outlined below.  
1.  Citizenship is central to our sense of 
identity: who we are (who I am) (??)
The singular and plural versions of the questions of 
identity noted in this heading are not mere grammati-
cal variants; and while references to citizenship may 
conceivably provide answers to “Who are we?”, they 
do not suffice for the singular version: “Who am I?” 
In this respect, the concept of citizenship – and more 
1 I wish to acknowledge the generous support of the Centre for 
Governance and Citizenship at the Hong Kong Institute of Edu-
cation, which provided support for me to present an earlier ver-
sion of this paper at the Conference “Education and Citizenship 
in a Globalising World”, Institute of Education, University of 
London (November 2010).
2 The search engine: Education Research Complete reports that 
in the period 2001-2010, the number of journal articles with 
titles containing “citizenship” was 1194, up from 234 a decade 
earlier. The corresponding figures for the term “civic” were 813 
and 166. The search engine ERIC reports somewhat more mo-
dest figures, but also shows a sharp increase.
specific instances such as Chinese, American, British, 
citizen etc. – are akin to other such parochial concepts 
as religion, ethnicity, language, community – along with 
their respective instances. The point here is basically a 
semantic one: the verb “to be” (in English) is radically 
ambiguous. In saying that I am (an) Australian citizen, 
I am predicating the property of being Australian of 
myself. At best, this is a case of identification not strict 
identity, because (i) this property is only one among 
many that apply to me, and (ii) the same property 
applies to others as well (viz. all Australian citizens; 
however this is defined). By contrast, if I declare that I 
am Laurance Splitter (in a situation where someone is 
either asking for me in a crowded room, or seeking to 
know my name), then I am, indeed, declaring myself 
to be identical to/with that person (in the same sense 
that 2+3 is identical with 5).
The distinction in question is conceptual. If an in-
dividual P identifies himself as a member of a class or 
group G, then P and G are two conceptually distinct 
entities here, each with its own identity conditions 
or criteria. We need, then, to specify such conditions 
for both P and G. Notice that the identity conditions 
for individual persons must allow for several possibili-
ties, including: my identification with others who are 
also persons (i.e. belonging to the same class or kind), 
my distinctness from non persons, and my distinctness 
from others who are also persons. By contrast, identity 
conditions for G are given more simply by such state-
ments as the following: “For x to be a member of G 
requires that x…”. For example, “For a person x to be 
an Australian citizen, x must either have been born in 
Australia or been naturalized”; “To be a Jew is (in strict 
orthodox terms) to be born of a Jewish mother or to 
have been converted according to Jewish law”; etc. 
It is appropriate for me to identify with other Aus-
tralian citizens, other Jews, etc., provided that (i) I do 
not see these affiliations as defining or prescribing 
the very person that I am; (ii) one kind of affiliation or 
self-identification does not exclude others; (iii) there 
will be other individuals, some of whom will also iden-
tify with these groups, while others will not; and (iv) 
I – or relevant others – see some point or purpose in 
so identifying. 
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Citizenship is a “collectivist” concept. It is one 
manifestation of our propensity to gather together, 
or associate, with others. Collectivism, in its most 
extreme forms (which Nel Noddings calls ‘the dark 
side of community’, 2002, 66) imposes a rigid clas-
sification, so that an individual’s own sense of iden-
tity is consumed – completely defined – by the 
group. In danger of being lost here is not only the 
individual’s sense of himself as an individual (an ac-
cusation historically leveled against Communist and 
other strongly socialist forms of government), but 
his sense of himself as a member of various other 
groups at the same time. Our freedom in a demo-
cratic society is marked by, among other things, our 
freedom of association. I may see myself as a Jew, 
but also as a university academic, a singer, an Aus-
tralian citizen, an eldest son, etc. Even if some of our 
group memberships are compulsory or involuntary, 
others are not. To insist that one such association is 
overriding or exclusive, is to commit what Amartya 
Sen calls the “Fallacy of Singular Affiliation” which 
can be seen as lying at the heart of much of the intol-
erance and discord to which we bear witness around 
the world today (Sen 2006, 20 ff.).
The Fallacy of Singular Affiliation afflicts especially 
the “large” groupings of nationality (citizenship), cul-
ture, race, religion, etc. This is because their “large-
ness” consists, not merely in their size, but in the ex-
tent of their claims on our allegiances and life-stories. 
Where a “small” collective like a book club is (usually) 
just that – a group of individuals with a common (lit-
erary) purpose – membership of a particular national-
ity, religion or culture carries with it, and is sustained 
by, a considerable amount of “baggage”, some of it 
morally innocuous, but some not. To be a member of 
that nation, religion or culture is, necessarily, to share 
the load of that baggage which – as recent instances 
have underscored – can impose contentious, even 
dangerous, impositions on its members.3
Given the types of issues and problems with which 
the social sciences are concerned – including equal-
ity, culture, exclusion, discrimination, etc. – it is not 
surprising that the literature has focused on groups or 
collectives, rather than individuals. In so doing, how-
ever, some writers have equivocated on the concept 
of identity, claiming to be addressing the issue of in-
dividual (“token”) identity, but actually sliding back 
to the level of collective (“type”) identity. Isin and 
Wood take up the challenge of reconciling the con-
cepts of citizenship and identity, stating (correctly) 
3 “In some ways, terrorism is an outgrowth of collectivism taken 
to its extreme. For collectivist-oriented individuals, the group 
(e.g., family, nation, religion) takes precedence over the individ-
ual,… The terrorist becomes fused with the group he represents, 
so much so that he is willing to sacrifice his own life to advance 
the group’s agenda and purposes.” Schwartz 2005, 304.
that “while citizenship has been associated with the 
universal, identity is associated with the particular.” 
(Isin, Wood 1999, 14). Later, they assert that:
‘Identity’ is a concept that presupposes a dialogical rec-
ognition of the other; it is a relational concept. But it 
is also a concept that presupposes identification in the 
sense that individuals recognize attributes or properties 
in each other that are construed as identical or at least 
similar. These properties, then, are used as an index of in-
dividual position and disposition. Identity is therefore a 
concept not so much of uniqueness or distinction as of 
resemblance and repetition (1999, 19). 
However, in shifting the focus from distinctness to 
resemblance, they thereby move irrevocably in the 
direction of the universal, away from the particular – 
despite their claims to the contrary. As I have already 
emphasized, the criteria grounding judgments relat-
ing to identity necessarily include both resemblance 
and distinctness. As long as we restrict considerations 
of identity to what binds individuals together (and, 
thereby, to what makes them different from other in-
dividuals who are not part of the group) we are refer-
ring to the identity of the group, not to that of its 
actual members. 
For another example, consider the following com-
ments from Stuart Hall, who traces the concept of 
identity from the “individualist” subject of the En-
lightenment; through the “sociological” subject, 
where “identity is formed in the ‘interaction’ between 
self and society”, to:
…the post-modern subject, conceptualized as having no 
fixed, essential or permanent identity. Identity becomes 
a ‘moveable feast’: formed and transformed continu-
ously in relation to the ways we are represented or ad-
dressed in the cultural systems which surround us…the 
subject assumes different identities at different times, 
identities which are not unified around a coherent ‘self’ 
(Hall 1992, 277). 
Notwithstanding Hall’s plausible analysis of these 
three conceptions of identity he, too, equivocates on 
the identity question, as evidenced by his acknowl-
edgment that the fragmentation, displacement and 
pluralization characteristic of post-modernist think-
ing, threatens to destroy the individual subject and 
its identity. I concede that the project of aligning 
myself with various groups and collectives has be-
come muddied by the reality that their identities are 
no longer fixed or determinate; but this no more de-
stroys my own identity than the empirical fact that 
each of us changes over time, in ways that may make 
the actual task of re-identification extremely difficult; 
witness the familiar example of asking one’s friends 
to “find me” in an old school photograph. Changes 
notwithstanding, it is still me, then and now. Indeed, 
the very concept of qualitative change makes sense 
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only on the assumption that the entity which changes 
remains numerically identical. 
Elsewhere Hall expresses a preference for the con-
cept of identification over identity: 
 
In common sense language, identification is constructed 
on the back of a recognition of some common origin or 
shared characteristics with another person or group, or 
with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidar-
ity and allegiance established on this foundation. (Hall 
1996, 2).4 
Once again, however, in so far as identification is 
a relation of alignment rather than distinction – we 
identify with something or someone – it cannot cap-
ture the full conditions of identity that apply to indi-
vidual persons. 
I am claiming that collectivist concepts – including 
citizenship – whose extensions are grouped together 
by virtue of shared properties, do not generate ad-
equate identity criteria for their (individual) members 
(i.e. persons). In certain contexts, it may well be of 
some importance that I am an official, an adult, a 
male, a considerate person, an Australian citizen, etc. 
Still, in almost all such cases, I could (both conceptu-
ally and empirically) and often do, survive the loss of 
the kind in question. It is still I who matured from 
infancy to adulthood, is transformed from a bully to 
a nurturer, who gives up citizenship of one country to 
become a citizen of another (or takes up dual citizen-
ship), etc. 
Notice the qualification “almost” here. In contrast 
to the classifications just listed, there are some prop-
erties which, necessarily, belong to me, in the sense 
that I could not exist without them. And among 
these, there is one which determines the conditions of 
my identity. It is not particularly controversial to sug-
gest that my belonging to the class of human persons 
– or, more straightforwardly, my being a person – is 
what determines these conditions.
Western philosophy has generated a plethora of 
theories tying the property of being a person with ap-
propriate criteria of identity. Such criteria ground our 
everyday judgments – “She is the same person as…”, 
He is a different person…”, “That person no longer ex-
ists (because he has died)”, “Aliens and higher primates 
4 Hall goes on to posit identification as an ongoing “construc-
tion, a process never completed”. I prefer to characterize this 
project in terms of a shifting or evolving set of identifications 
and differences but – for reasons which I have tried to make 
clear – my actual continuing identity is not in question. Hall, 
in a review of Postmodernist perspectives on persons – spe-
cifically, on the challenge of bridging our social and psycho-
logical conceptions of the self – remarks on the influence of 
Paul Hirst’s critique, which is essentially a charge of question-
begging (Hall 1996, 7): the construction of the self within and 
through discourse assumes that the self is already constituted 
as subject. My argument, based primarily on semantic conside-
rations, is along similar lines.
could be regarded as persons (albeit not human per-
sons)” – as we track individuals through space and time. 
To claim that being a person is associated with specific 
identity criteria is tantamount to declaring that person 
is the appropriate kind or concept for objects which fall 
under it (i.e. individual persons). This means, inter alia, 
that the very existence of a person depends on the ap-
plicability of these criteria. So, on the one hand, if the 
criteria fail, then the person ceases to be a person and, 
thereby, ceases to be, period. On the other hand, as long 
as the criteria succeed in identifying and re-identifying 
a specific person (through space and time), then that 
person retains his identity in the face of all other chang-
es (recall the school photo example).5 
2.  Citizenship is central to who 
we (collectively) are in a 
socio-political sense
This assertion, interpreted empirically, is hard to deny 
(subject to who the “we” are). Governments of many 
different persuasions clearly have a stake here (for 
purposes of collecting revenue through taxation, if 
nothing else), but if we broaden our perspective to 
include education (remembering that, by and large, 
governments also determine the shape of educational 
policy and practice), we face the familiar issue of how 
to evaluate the appropriateness of government and 
social determinations in regard to children and oth-
ers whose voices carry little, if any, weight. Moreover, 
we see, once again, the shift from defining (the iden-
tity of) a collective, such as a nation or a people, to 
identifying essential characteristics of the individual 
members of that collective. Accordingly, the question 
to consider here is: “How important is an individual’s 
citizenship (status) to her/his well-being, as judged ei-
ther by that person or by others?” 
The main difficulty with this question is that it is 
not merely empirical – and, therefore, highly contex-
tual – but psychological and, hence, largely subjective. 
Where one person may judge that his citizenship plays 
a vital role in his life, another may simply deny this (by 
focusing on a broader, more cosmopolitan ideal, or on 
other affiliations and associations which matter more 
to him). Thus far, then, there is little to justify giving 
a central place to this concept within an educational 
framework. Further, even those for whom citizenship 
genuinely matters need to concede certain difficulties. 
After all, such concepts as citizenship, religion, culture, 
and ethnicity serve to divide as much as to unite – if 
only in political and legal terms (but usually in moral 
and affective terms as well; citizens are exhorted to 
5 See also Hall 1996, where he reiterates his rejection of any kind 
of essentialist conception of identity. The view that I am defen-
ding could be described as essentialist in the sense that being 
a human person is the essential property that allows us to track 
individual persons through space and time.
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feel a sense of pride and loyalty to their particular na-
tion or state, which often, albeit not inevitably, leads 
to feelings of superiority over, and disdain for, others 
who are members of different nations). It is hard to 
see the merit of attempting to identify in terms of a 
divisive classification, particularly when it comes to 
seeing ourselves as moral agents. I shall return to this 
point.6 In response, some writers have distinguished 
between various forms of nationalism and patriotism 
(for example, Kennedy 2009, 7), but the fact remains 
that in socio-political terms, nation-states and their 
leaders have proven both willing and able to exploit 
the natural inclination to “belong” for their own self-
centred interests. 
3.  Citizenship education is the proper 
home for teaching values (including 
moral, political and social values) 
It is this claim, perhaps about all others, that is used 
to justify citizenship and civics education, in their vari-
ous forms in the curriculum. One way of refuting it is 
to come up with a superior framework for teaching val-
ues, one which does not rely on – or, at least, subsumes 
– conceptions of citizenship. I have hinted that such a 
framework can adequately be provided by the concept 
of person. I shall now elaborate on this position. 
The major political movements over the past four 
hundred years (since the Enlightenment and the rise of 
Modernism) – ranging from extreme liberalism or indi-
vidualism to extreme communitarianism or collectiv-
ism – are associated with corresponding views about 
how both individual persons and nation-states relate 
to, and function in, the broader socio-political frame-
work. Locating the individual person somewhere along 
this range does not, I suggest, capture what is most 
important about personhood. An alternative model 
identifies personhood as an irreducibly relational con-
struct. In this model, the idea that each of us exists in, 
and through, our relations with other persons, is at the 
very heart of our understanding of what being a per-
son means. This idea has been articulated by writers 
and theorists in several disciplines and coming from 
several distinct perspectives. It is a recurring theme in 
the pragmatists C. S. Peirce, G. H. Mead and, of course, 
John Dewey; no less so in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, 
Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas and Hans-Georg Ga-
damer; and again, in the theoretical and applied re-
search of Lev Vygotsky and Jerome Bruner (where the 
6 Martha Nussbaum (1996, 5) notes that “at bottom, nationalism 
and ethnocentric particularism are not alien to one another – 
but akin”. Nussbaum 1996: 5. One writer who appreciates the 
distinction between citizenship – as it applies to persons – and 
national identity is Jürgen Habermas who points out that free-
dom in the name of national independence is quite different 
from the freedom enjoyed (or not) by citizens within a nation: 
“Citizenship was never conceptually tied to national identity.” 
(Habermas 1994, 23).  
skills and tools of thought are seen in terms of internal-
ized social and linguistic behavior). Among contempo-
rary philosophers, Taylor is a prominent proponent of 
the view that human life has a fundamentally dialogi-
cal – hence, relational – character in virtue of the status 
of human persons as, essentially, reason-making crea-
tures (Taylor 1991, 33). In Taylor (who duly acknowl-
edges the work of Bakhtin on our “inner dialogicality”, 
Taylor 1991, 127), we find a line of thought which offers 
a genuine alternative to the familiar dichotomy of the 
subjective or monological view of the self versus some 
kind of externalized or objectified conception).7 
Interpersonal relationships may be identified at all 
points on the spectrum from individual to universal. 
From the intimate perspective of Buber’s “I-Thou”, to 
the broadest conception of global citizenship, the key 
construct remains the idea of persons in relationship 
with one another.8 Constructing appropriate identity 
criteria for personhood may be seen as part of the 
broader project of “finding/conceptualizing oneself” 
which, when viewed relationally, involves the ongo-
ing task of positioning myself as one among others.9 
It may be that the post-modernist metaphors of 
fragmentation and incompleteness apply to such en-
tities as cultures, nations, ethnicities, and so on. But 
I interpret this as a challenge to those who maintain 
that these collectivist notions remain viable, in both 
semantic and practical terms. On the point of viability, 
I remain open-minded. My concern is with the individ-
uals who are thus collected and classified; their viabili-
ty is guaranteed by the simple fact of their persistence 
through space and time, according to whichever crite-
ria of identity are judged to be adequate to the task. 
In the following sections of the paper, I point out 
some implications of this conceptualization of person-
hood for moral and citizenship education. Regarding 
the relational concept of a person as the appropriate 
locus for ethical behavior relieves the concept of citi-
zenship of a prescriptive burden for which it is ill-suited. 
7 Where Cheng et al view the relational construction of person-
hood as challenging the notion of personal identity, I see them 
as entirely consistent. Cheng et al 2006, 4. 
8 Buber 1971. 
9 The relational conception I am defending places the person at 
the center of the “Who am I?” debate, thereby distinguishing 
it from the universalist view called “Cosmopolitanism”, as 
espoused by Nussbaum and others (Nussbaum et al 1996). As 
sympathetic critics have pointed out, Nussbaum’s case against 
nationalism and patriotism can be restated without recourse 
to any such universalist commitments. For example, Putnam, 
replying to Nussbaum, says: “That someone is a fellow being 
[person], a fellow passenger to the grave, has moral weight for 
me; ‘citizen of the world does not’.” (Nussbaum et al 1996, 95). 
I agree also with Gutman, who points out that such phrases 
as “the community of human beings in the entire world” and 
“citizens of the world” reflect “another parochial form of nati-
onalism, albeit on a global scale.” (Nussbaum et al 1996, 70). I 
view the more contemporary term “global citizenship” in the 
same light.
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4. Persons, citizens and morality
It seems reasonable to take, as a starting point, the 
idea that morality comes into play because we persons 
are both social and reflective creatures: continually in-
teracting with one another, and with the capacity – 
hence, the obligation – to think about our behavior in 
prescriptive, as well as descriptive, terms. Further, as-
suming a relational conception of personhood necessi-
tates the construction of an ethical framework whose 
most basic prescriptions apply to all, and only, persons 
in the context of their relationships with one another. 
In so far as it is persons who are obliged to act mor-
ally, it is also persons whose interests and concerns 
ought to be taken most seriously in ethical judgment 
and decision making. This by no means excludes our 
moral obligations to non persons but it does imply a 
“pecking” order. Killing a child is universally, and appro-
priately, regarded as being more serious than killing 
a rabbit. Further – and this point is especially perti-
nent – it implies that persons – qua those individuals 
like you and me, who live (and die) according to the 
usual patterns of nature and circumstance – are more 
important, ethically speaking, than any and all collec-
tives with which they may be associated. I am not pro-
posing that when faced with a choice between killing 
one person and killing an entire group, we should opt 
for the latter, but this is because such a group is con-
stituted simply of individuals who are each persons in 
their own right. My target here is the “large” group or 
collective, considered in more abstract or institutional 
terms. Consider the following examples: 
 
“Gay marriage would destroy the sanctity of the Family”
“The State is more important than the individuals in it”
“Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you 
can do for your country!”
“That’s not the way we do things in this family/culture/
society”.
In each of these examples, the rights and well-being 
of one or more actual persons are subjugated to those 
of the broader collective, where the latter is construed 
as having moral value above and beyond any proper-
ties of its actual members (the whole is greater than 
the sum of its parts). In critiquing such instances, my 
point is not to resurrect some version of crude Indi-
vidualism over an equally crude Collectivism; rather, it 
is to question the propriety of elevating the collective, 
as an entity in its own right, over those individuals 
who, at any given time, are members of it.10 It also 
calls attention to the power of collectives to impose 
their own “baggage” on their members, in so far as 
they view themselves as being greater than the sums 
of their constituent parts. 
I maintain that citizenship has little, if anything, 
to contribute to conceptions of morality and moral 
education that is not already covered by reference 
to persons who, after all, are the key players in moral 
transactions. 
I do not question the right of a state, nation, soci-
ety or religion to articulate and implement the kind 
of education – including moral education – that it 
deems appropriate (although I have strong views 
about what form this should take if it is worthy of be-
ing called “education”). After all, most governments 
take their commitment to education seriously.11 How-
ever, from the premise that moral education is pro-
vided by the state, it does not follow that the state 
is justified in inserting itself as a specific beneficiary 
or even a stake-holder when it comes to the moral 
commitments of its citizens. This would be akin to a 
teacher of ethics insisting that her students hold her 
in special regard, morally speaking, simply because of 
her role as teacher. 
One commentator who has taken a more nuanced 
stance on the relationship between citizenship and 
morality is J. Mark Halstead. He has proposed several 
models of what citizenship education might look like, 
within a broadly Liberal moral and political frame-
work, but rejects the thesis – which, he sees as gain-
ing ground in the UK – that citizenship education, 
properly construed, would make moral education 
redundant (Halstead, Pike 2006; Halstead 2006; I re-
fer to this henceforth as the “redundancy thesis”). I 
agree with his conclusion here, but would go further 
and suggest that moral education, when properly 
conceived and implemented, challenges the idea that 
citizenship education “adds value” to this conception. 
Halstead proposes three models of citizenship ed-
ucation, whose key aims may be summarized as fol-
lows: (1) to produce informed citizens (Halstead, Pike 
2006, 34), specifically citizens (i.e. adult persons who 
10 I leave aside the question of whether these claims actually 
make sense! The third example, famously proclaimed by John 
F. Kennedy in January, 1961, reflects a noble sentiment which 
might better be expressed as “Ask not what your country can 
do for you personally; ask what we can do together”. I endorse 
the value of “the common good”, as long as this term refers 
to the goods held in common by individuals, rather than the 
goods allegedly held by some collective which exists in abs-
traction from individuals. 
11 This commitment is somewhat blurred with the growth of pri-
vate and home schooling. Such non-public institutions often 
impose or reflect moral viewpoints that are at odds with those 
advocated by the state. See Sen 2006, 117. But then, they are 
also representative of those “large groupings” toward which I 
have expressed concern earlier in the paper. 
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are part of the nation in question) who are knowl-
edgeable about citizenship (Halstead 2006, 203); (2) 
to socialize students into the dominant values of the 
society, with an emphasis on obedience, commit-
ment, patriotism and authority; this is also called 
“Education for good citizenship” (2006, 204, emphasis 
added); (3) “to prepare children for active participa-
tion in the political, civil and social life of the com-
munity”; also called “Education for active citizenship” 
(2006, 206, emphasis added). Halstead claims, first, 
that while (1) is basically descriptive, (2) and (3) are 
clearly prescriptive; and secondly, that while (3) has a 
strong critical component – reflecting the value of au-
tonomy in Liberal society – (2) deliberately presents 
values and issues as uncontroversial because it values 
conformity and passivity over autonomy.12
In the context of the question which forms the title 
of his 2006 paper (“Does citizenship education make 
moral education redundant?”), Halstead favours (3) 
over the other two models – which is to be expected 
given his preference for a liberal democratic value 
scheme (Halstead, Pike 2006, Ch. 2). I endorse his 
preference, not because of anything specific to citi-
zenship education, but because every subject should 
be taught in a critical and reflective spirit, encourag-
ing students to question what is presented to them. It 
is a cliché that nothing in education (or schooling) is 
value-free. Every subject that is taught – or not taught 
– carries prescriptive baggage which is more often 
implicit than explicit. The muddled idea of “moral 
neutrality”, while pretending to offer protection to 
vulnerable youngsters, actually threatens to impose 
on them – if only by default – the moral agenda of 
the dominant status quo and other interest groups. Ac-
cordingly, one key goal of moral education must be to 
provide students with the wherewithal to “sniff out” 
and reflectively critique such agendas whenever and 
wherever they occur. In so far as citizenship educa-
tion does embrace or reflect certain values these, too, 
along with other aspects of civic “knowledge”, should 
be open to question. 
In rejecting the redundancy thesis, Halstead main-
tains that citizenship education is, and should be treat-
ed as, a separate domain from moral education. He 
holds that a proper conceptual framework for citizen-
ship will include values that are not moral values but, 
rather, political, civic, economic and legal values. In 
particular, given his commitment to a liberal socio-eco-
nomic framework, he proposes three core liberal values, 
viz. freedom, equality and rationality, where the third-
12 McLaughlin 1992 sees (1), (2) and (3) in terms of a continuum, 
ranging from “minimal” to “maximal” conceptions of citizen-
ship. He criticizes British Government policy of the day – and, 
one can imagine, of today as well – for working with and pro-
moting a muddled conception of citizenship, one whose edu-
cational implications in terms of such components as morality 
and critical thinking are quite unclear.
mentioned acts as a normative safeguard between the 
first two, which are often in conflict (Halstead, Pike 
2006, 28). What are we to make of these claims?
Much depends here on an appropriate understand-
ing of values, for they will be key substantive compo-
nents in citizenship education, over and above civic 
knowledge (which is intended to be largely factual in 
nature). Halstead offers the following characterisation:
Values are principles and fundamental convictions which 
act as justifications for activity in the public domain and 
as general guides to private behavior; they are enduring 
beliefs about what is worthwhile, ideals for which people 
strive and broad standards by which particular practices 
are judged to be good, right, desirable or worthy of re-
spect. (Halstead, Pike 2006, 24). 
There is much to like about this definition, particularly 
its focus on values as ideals and standards (criteria) 
for making good judgments.13 Still, whether or not 
we classify freedom and equality, (along with other val-
ues such as democracy, pluralism, etc.,…), as underpin-
ning citizenship, they are, surely, moral values. From 
Halstead’s discussion of these values, it is clear that 
they can be justified in terms of their contribution to 
personal and interpersonal well-being. Democracy, for 
example, “is seen by liberals as the most rational safe-
guard against tyranny and the best way of guarantee-
ing the equal right of citizens to determine for them-
selves what is in their own best interests.” (Halstead, 
Pike 2006, 29). I grant that the concept of democracy 
might best be accommodated in a course on civics, or 
politics, etc.; my point is that as a value, it is justified, 
ultimately, in moral terms. 
Why, then, do Halstead and other writers on citizen-
ship education persist in the view that there are val-
ues which are tied to citizenship (perhaps via politics 
or the law) rather than morality? The answer, I sug-
gest, lies in the so-called distinction between private 
and public values, the idea being that whereas the for-
mer belong to the sphere of (personal) morality – and 
are, thereby, subjective and contestable – the latter 
are the common (shared) threads that hold a citizenry 
together – and, accordingly, must be relatively objec-
tive and uncontroversial (Halstead, Pike 2006, 37; Hal-
stead 2006, 207; also McLaughlin 1992). However, even 
noting Halstead’s own reservations about the private/
public distinction, I maintain that on a relational 
view of personhood, this dualism, like many others, 
does not stand up to scrutiny.14
13 Not all values “act as justifications for activity”, but we can 
agree that ethical ones do.
14 I agree with Kiwan who questions the link between citizenship 
and values on the grounds that “Human rights are rights of an 
individual, underpinned by common values for all human be-
ings [read: human persons], rather than rights inherently based 
on or derived from being a member of a political community or 
nation-state.” Kiwan 2008, 55.
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I am sympathetic to Halstead’s project of locating 
values between the extremes of subjectivism and 
objectivism (Halstead, Pike 2006, 25). But I would go 
further and assert that values, like concepts gener-
ally, occupy the middle ground which prevents these 
extremes from gaining purchase in the first place. To 
take as given the distinction between subjectivist 
(purely private) and objectivist (public) domains (as in 
both the Cartesian and classical Empiricist traditions) 
is to court semantic and epistemological disaster. On 
the one hand, the private realm of the subjective must 
necessarily be separate for each individual thinker; 
indeed, it could, at best, be known only in the first 
person, thereby rendering shared communication and 
interpretation intrinsically impossible. In short, if we 
begin with “private” knowledge, we will never move 
beyond it.15 On the other hand, the idea that values 
are given objectively, i.e. as objects independently of 
our own perceptions and conceptions, leads to the 
exclusion of any individual interpretation or construc-
tion, and to wondering how it is possible for values 
to be internalized, on the one hand, or challenged, on 
the other. Elsewhere, I have argued that the key con-
cepts of inquiry and judgment are also to be located 
between these same extremes, and for the same rea-
son, viz. to remind us that the subjective and objec-
tive realms of experience are conceptually interwoven 
(Splitter 2010). It is in this context that I question the 
viability of the private-public distinction.
Somewhat ironically, there is a growing body of evi-
dence suggesting that in China – and, perhaps, Con-
fucian-based societies generally – the private-public 
discussion is also downplayed, no more so than in the 
context of moral and civics education. If the State – a 
“large” group if ever there were one! – is the crucial de-
terminant of identity (a claim which I have rejected), 
then in a very real sense, all is public and, following 
the same line of reasoning as revealed above, uncon-
troversial. While official government policy is not 
easily accessible (state secrecy being a by-product of 
non-democratic systems), it becomes clear listening 
to educators from Mainland China that the notion of 
a private morality – like that of a private citizen – is 
a non-starter. So far so good, one might think, except 
for the rider that since key moral values and principles 
are uncontroversial, they can be both taught and man-
dated as such.
15 Many philosophers have been critical of both classical dualism 
and empiricism. See, for example, Wittgenstein’s argument 
against the idea of a “private language”, Wittgenstein 1968, 
§§243ff. My thinking here follows P. F. Strawson, in his celebrat-
ed account of the concept of person as primitive with respect 
to, and preempting any conceptual gap between, mind and 
body. Strawson 1959, Ch. 3. I note also that Donald Davidson 
pursued a line of reasoning about agency and truth that culmi-
nated in his rejection of subjectivity as an ontological category. 
See Davidson 1982, 1991, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2001. 
The idea that being a person should be understood 
relationally, i.e. in terms of how individual persons 
relate to one another, implies that the various proper-
ties associated with personhood are also understood 
as applying equally to myself and to other persons. 
As noted above, the possibility of moral judgment de-
pends upon this relationship and, hence, on all inter-
personal relationships.16 Such a relational conception 
leaves no room for either the “private morality/public 
citizenship” mentality of (some) Western thinkers, or 
the “all is public and predetermined” stereotype of 
the Chinese system. 
Allow me to reflect briefly on the British experience, 
in response to perceptions of a decline in moral stan-
dards and political awareness on the part of young 
people and, more specifically, to the tragic events on 
the London Underground, in July 2005.17 Whereas the 
events on the East coast of the USA on September 
11, 2001, led – politically, at least – to the develop-
ment of an “Us (Americans)-and-Them (anyone who 
disagrees with us)” mentality, those in Britain exacer-
bated a more introspective response that was already 
under-way; namely, to seek to unite what had become 
a pluralistic or multi-cultural society around a core 
set of values that captured or represented the idea of 
“Britishness” (Kiwan 2008; Taylor 2006). But this idea 
is confused at best and dangerous at worst. It could 
succeed only at the cost of perpetuating a toxic “us-
and-them” mentality; even within British society, em-
phasis on some core set of shared values would result 
in either a largely innocuous set of findings (“Britons 
value peace and fairness”, etc.) or a growing sense of 
exclusion on the part of those British citizens who 
happened not to share those values. 
16 Habermas may plausibly be interpreted along similar lines. In 
focusing attention on the role of citizens (of whatever nation) 
as contributing to an “intersubjectively shared praxis”, he 
looked forward to a “European Community” which respects 
democratic and other citizen-related rights, unencumbered by 
historical national boundaries. His idea of “deliberative democ-
racy” is akin to that of the “community of inquiry”, in so far as 
the latter can be imagined at a broad social level. Habermas 
1994, 24 ff.
17 See Kiwan 2008 for a comprehensive review of citizenship edu-
cation in the UK, where this topic has been much debated over 
the past twenty years. The tensions wrought by cultural and 
other large-scale divisions are often exacerbated by the tabloid 
media. Headlines like “Are they British or Muslim?” referring 
to the young men behind the London subway bombings, assu-
me that a person cannot be both or, at least, that even if he is 
both, one must take priority over the other. This is an example 
of Sen’s Fallacy of Singular Affiliation. Further, I suggest that 
while such questions appear to reflect a concern for individual 
identity, they actually are grounded in a concern for the identity 
of the collective(s) in question. The real issue behind the “British 
or Muslim” question above is not the interests or identities of 
British citizens or Muslims; rather, it is the interests and iden-
tity of Britain or Islam as national and religious institutions, 
respectively.
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We do not need the heavy and potentially divisive 
language of patriotism, nationalism and citizenship, 
to identify and urge the appropriate moral point. The 
tragedy of July 2005 was not that a group of British 
Muslims wrought havoc in Britain and on the lives 
of other British citizens, but that a group of human 
persons murdered another group of human persons. In 
the same vein, the appropriate educational and moral 
response should focus on how it is possible for people 
to behave in this way toward other people (and, in 
turn, how to prevent such behavior), rather than on 
the implications of being confused about one’s own 
“identity”, in nationalistic and religious/ethnic terms. 
5. Values and citizenship in the classroom
In rejecting the private/public distinction, we might 
focus more directly on the merits of a values frame-
work which is grounded on inter-personal relation-
ships, both of the intimate and more global varieties. 
On this point, I have argued that a form of Construc-
tivism, suitably interpreted, has much to offer (Split-
ter 2009). Values, like concepts, and unlike biases, 
prejudices and other belief-forms, are constructed ac-
cording to the norms and standards of collaborative 
inquiry. Referring back to the definition offered by 
Halstead and Pike, the key theme of (moral) values be-
ing beliefs and ideals about what is judged to be good, 
right, and desirable, begs the question of who is do-
ing the judging and whether or not they are skilled in 
judgment-formation. In their chapter entitled “How 
children learn values”, the authors emphasize the role 
of “critical reflection and discussion” in values forma-
tion and application (Halstead, Pike 2006, 148), albeit 
as one strategy among others. The transformation of 
classrooms into collaborative thinking environments 
is an invitation to young people to take an active role 
in their own values education.18 
Adopting terminology based on the work of Dewey, 
Mead, Vygostky, Lipman and others, such collabora-
tive thinking environments may be called communi-
ties of inquiry (“CoI”).19 Participating in a CoI allows 
students, individually and collaboratively, to develop 
their own ideas and perspectives based on appro-
priately rigorous modes of thinking and against the 
18 I reject what I call the “heirloom” view of values, according to 
which values are precious, fragile objects handed down from 
generation to generation, with a stern admonition not to ex-
amine them too carefully lest they fall apart. Such an ossified, 
inert conception of values is both popular in the public mind 
and worthless in educational terms.
19 The community of inquiry is one type of community of practice 
(Wenger 1998), but as a normative or prescriptive construct, it 
guarantees that the practice in question is worthwhile and not 
destructive or toxic. The CoI has been most fully developed in 
the literature and practice of Philosophy for Children. See Lip-
man et al 1980, Splitter, Sharp 1995, Lipman 2003, Splitter 2007, 
2009, 2010. For an insightful historical discussion of this con-
cept, see Seixas 1993.
background of a thorough understanding and appre-
ciation of those ideas and perspectives that, having 
stood the test of time, may be represented as soci-
ety’s best view of things to date. In a CoI, learning 
is transformed into thinking (or, better, inquiry), and 
knowledge into understanding and good judgment. 
Students are encouraged to work out for what they 
stand, to what they are committed, and what they 
judge to be worthwhile, but always in a fallibilistic 
spirit (“This is what I believe/value – and I can tell 
you why – but I might be wrong.”). They learn to work 
with the tension that comes with disagreement, pre-
cisely because they do not see their beliefs and values 
as bound up with their own identities. 
I concede that among the things for which many 
ordinary persons stand, to which they are commit-
ted, and which they judge to be worthwhile, their af-
filiations with, and memberships of, associations of 
one sort or another – whether voluntary or not – are 
bound to be prominent. My nation, my religion, my 
language, my culture (qua “large group” affiliations) 
may well feature here, along with a range of other 
(“small group”) connections such as (to) my family, my 
friends, my class or school; as well as my values, core 
beliefs and convictions. Granted, these affiliations and 
connections are elaborations on the kind of person I 
am, but – remembering the person in the school photo 
– they presuppose, rather than constitute, my continuing 
identity. The relevant distinction here is between self-
determination – concerning the kind of person I am 
or want to be – and (numerical) identity – concerning 
the very person that I am. Awareness of this distinc-
tion is, itself, a form of empowerment, even for young 
children: specific pathologies (such as schizophrenia) 
aside, the underlying thread of my own existence in 
space and time can be seen as inviolable.
This process of elaboration includes but is not re-
stricted to the moral domain, although that domain 
is central to it. To regard myself as a member of an 
inquiring community is to see myself as one among 
others which, in turn, has three key components which 
are both cognitive and affective: understanding and 
appreciating my own self-worth and place in the com-
munity; understanding and appreciating that others 
are striving for the very same kind of self-apprecia-
tion; and understanding and appreciating that self-
appreciation and appreciation for others are interde-
pendent and mutually reinforcing (hence, the “Golden 
Rule”, versions of which are found in just about every 
moral code and tradition known to humanity). 
The CoI is an interactive environment whose en-
tire rationale is the well-being of its members (in 
intellectual, moral, and affective terms). This means, 
first, that issues of concern – including those affili-
ations and connections referred to in the previous 
paragraph – should be treated as open to collabora-
tive inquiry and decision-making; and secondly, that 
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the community itself has no agenda over and above 
that of the well-being its members. As a network of 
interpersonal relationships, it is the very paradigm of 
a “small” group or, as I like to put it, no larger than 
the sum of its parts (Splitter 2007, 2009, 2010). There is 
no inherent value or worth in the CoI, as a collective, 
beyond that of its members. It serves as a vital means 
to an end, and that end is the personal development 
of those members.
The contrast with our respective national, religious, 
and cultural affiliations is stark, for these groups are 
seen as worth preserving in their own right – as being, 
in other words, greater than the sums of their parts – 
hence the potential for tension and conflict as each 
of them vies for our allegiance. It is this sense of al-
legiance to something larger than any and all of us 
that threatens the possibility of seeing oneself simply 
as one among others. Conversely, the CoI acts as a 
safeguard against manipulation and indoctrination 
– which is why it is an appropriate environment for 
moral education – precisely because it is regulated by 
the normative ideal of thinking critically and carefully 
about matters of importance.20 
Arguments for and against including specific sub-
jects in the school curriculum may now proceed 
on the assumption that whatever is taught will be 
viewed, by students and teachers alike, as forms of 
inquiry, to be judged and assessed, ultimately, by 
criteria deemed to be appropriate in that context. I 
see no reason why various forms of civics, citizen-
ship, and cosmopolitan education could not be in-
cluded here as legitimate areas of inquiry, alongside 
language, literature, mathematics, etc. But the mem-
bers of a community of inquiry must be vigilant to 
ensure that none of these disciplines threatens their 
own (personal) identity, although they may well af-
20 This normative ideal is crucial. Without it, pluralistic and 
multi-cultural societies face irresolvable difficulties in accom-
modating moral and cultural traditions which are simply in-
compatible – either with one another or with the prevailing 
state or government framework. Teaching children to think for 
themselves will amount to little if it is not part of the culture 
of every educational institution. A similar point is made, in no 
uncertain terms, by Sen, in his critique of governments and 
societies that encourage the formation of narrowly-sectarian 
school communities in the name of cultural pluralism (2006, 
117). Sen is critical of the agendas of such communities, which 
are likely to be inimical to open, structured inquiry and the 
skills and dispositions associated with it. Although he does not 
refer specifically to classroom dynamics, he emphasizes the im-
portance of teaching children how to reason and make good 
choices, decisions and judgments. The better option is right 
before our eyes – at least for those living in large urban cen-
ters: it is the institution of public schooling which, inevitably, 
brings together just the kinds of diversity that are needed for 
genuine inquiry. With a multitude of nations, cultures, religi-
ons and other categories right there in the classroom, teachers 
have a wonderful opportunity to apply the principle that we 
find out who we truly are through being one among others.
fect and shape their judgments of what they regard as 
important. It is hard to see how knowledge – includ-
ing knowledge about one’s country, political system, 
etc. – genuinely sought and gained, could pose such 
a threat, but where citizenship education extends to 
instilling such affective responses as patriotism and 
nationalism, teachers and students reserve the right 
to challenge or reject such responses, just as they do 
in response to an insistence on a particular religious 
or tribal affiliation. 
In terms of actual school and classroom practice, 
there are several important implications. First, if citi-
zenship is to remain a viable construct in educational 
terms, students from an early age should be encour-
aged to regard themselves as citizens here and now, 
and not merely as “future citizens in training”. Sec-
ondly, this intrinsic sense of citizenship by no means 
rules out the idea that schooling should (help) prepare 
them to be well-informed, more active and critically 
reflective citizens of society-at-large. Indeed, to bor-
row a phrase from Leung and Yuen, the school and 
classroom might be seen as crucibles for democracy 
(Leung, Yuen 2009), in which genuine deliberation on 
real issues leads to decision-making and action. Third-
ly, however, in a classroom CoI, to be, or to become, a 
citizen is to be, or to become, a person, in the sense 
defended in this paper; that is, an individual who is 
working out their path in life by engaging, critically 
and empathetically, with others who are doing like-
wise.. It is not about instilling a misguided sense of 
loyalty or commitment to the classroom or school as 
an entity in its own right. Finally, those in charge of 
running schools and classrooms must think carefully 
about the full extent of any commitment to trans-
form them into inquiring communities. It is dishonest 
to the point of hypocrisy for those in power to “allow” 
young people to think for themselves and form their 
own judgments in some areas but not others. Non-
negotiability is corrosive to inquiry, whether the con-
text be the formal school curriculum or beyond it. Stu-
dents cannot engage in critical reflection under the 
constraint that some, at least, of what they choose to 
think about – for example, so-called key public values 
– is not really open to question and must, ultimately, 
be accepted as the price of belonging to one’s soci-
ety. As C.S Peirce and others committed to the ideals 
of collaborative inquiry stressed, the path to genuine 
inquiry should not be blocked. Pre-empted conclusions 
or, worse, “taboo” topics, block the process of inquiry 
and should be avoided.21 
21 Leung and Yuen 2009 cite a study in which students at a Hong 
Kong secondary school were encouraged to negotiate many 
issues, including their own style of school uniform, within a 
context in which such actions as “Changing natural colour of 
the hair” were simply ruled as unacceptable!
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6. Concluding comment
To see ourselves as persons in the world is to see our-
selves in an ever-changing network of inter-personal 
relationships. It has become increasingly important 
to expand this network beyond local and national 
boundaries, to embrace a more cosmopolitan ideal. 
Whatever perspective we opt for, we all must learn 
strategies for dealing with the tensions that inevita-
bly arise. As reflective persons, our informed choices 
in this regard must be taken seriously by our govern-
ments as well as by our teachers. For reasons which I 
have attempted to articulate, I am not convinced that 
notions of citizenship have much place in these net-
works and perspectives; we may hope, at least, that 
they are not taken for granted. 
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